In engineering design research different models of functional decomposition are advanced sideby-side. In this paper I explain and validate this co-existence of models in terms of the Kuhnian thesis of methodological incommensurability. I advance this analysis in terms of the thesis' construal of (non-algorithmic) theory choice in terms of values, expanding this notion to the engineering domain. I further argue that the (by some) implicated threat of the thesis to rational theory choice has no force in the functional decomposition case: co-existence of different models of functional decomposition is rational from an instrumental point of view. My explanation covers cases in which different models are advanced as means for the same objective. Such cases cannot be explicated with the explanatory construct of variety in objectives, as advanced in other analyses of co-existing conceptualizations in engineering.
Introduction
Engineering design research on the modeling of technical functions provides what seems to be a striking contrast with research in the sciences. Whereas research in the sciences exhibits an orientation toward establishing (increasingly) unambiguous and commonly shared concepts 1 -and engages in debate about the adequacy of the conceptualizations proposed -functional modeling research does not, by and large, strive toward such conceptual uniformity nor engages in such debate. For instance, a key concept such as function lacks a uniform meaning in functional modeling research but, instead, is specific to particular modeling frameworks (cf. Erden et al. 2008) . Models of functional decomposition, i.e., graphical representations of organized sets of functions, likewise come in a variety of flavors. And the majority of authors in functional modeling research accept this status quo. Some authors do aim to develop a common framework for functional modeling by means of specific functional conceptualizations (cf. Erden et al. 2008; Chandrasekaran 2005 ). Yet, most authors merely stick to advancing their favored frameworks without superiority claims over other ones.
Philosophical analyses of the co-existence of different conceptualizations in engineering explain the maintaining of this status quo as having instrumental value to engineering (cf. Bucciarelli 1994 Bucciarelli , 2003 Vermaas 2009; Van Eck 2010a) . The analyses of Bucciarelli (1994 Bucciarelli ( , 2003 and Vermaas (2009) relate specific conceptualizations (as suitable means) to specific objectives, thus explaining (and validating) co-existence in terms of a variety of engineering ends. I have argued that the choice for and suitability of particular models of functional decomposition for particular objectives is influenced by whether or not specific design knowledge is employed in building these models, thus explaining (and validating) co-existence of different models in terms of variation in design knowledge employment (Van Eck 2010a) . This latter analysis explains coexistence in informative fashion insofar as the knowledge used in building models does not contain or refer to a specific notion of function or specific functional decomposition model. When the knowledge used does already refer to a specific notion of function or specific model of functional decomposition, the choice for (the construction of) specific models is obvious, but explication of such choices in terms of knowledge employment would become circular.
In this paper I further expand on the above analyses. Focusing on research on the modeling of functional decompositions, I argue that different functional decomposition models are also advanced in the engineering literature as means for the same objective. What to think of coexistence in this case? The questions that I will address are (i) why co-existence of different models obtains when the objective for which they are constructed is the same (rather than fixing a single best and commonly shared model) and (ii) whether the above implicated value of coexistence also holds in the case of co-existing and different models that are constructed for the same objective?
The previous analyses of co-existence that put forward variety in objectives as a central explanatory construct do not cover the above case(s) in which different functional decomposition models are used side-by-side as means toward the same objective. And neither does an explanation in terms of variation in design knowledge employment, since the models advanced in the above case are built using knowledge that already refers to specific models of functional decomposition. I will therefore follow a different tack to explain this case. I explain co-existence in this functional decomposition case in terms of the Kuhnian thesis of methodological incommensurability. 2 Key to this thesis is the notion that there is no neutral algorithm that governs scientific theory choice. Kuhn (1977) argued that theoretical disputes between advocates of rival frameworks cannot be solved by recourse to a neutral algorithm that dictates theory choice, since there is no commonly shared set of criteria or standards available on the basis of which such a choice can be forged. Kuhn (1977) pressed the point that such standards do not function as algorithmic rules by which one is able to determine theory choice but, rather, as values guiding such choices. I explain co-existence in terms of (and by expanding on) Kuhn's notion that one can explain divergence of theory choice in terms of variation in values. I argue that the choice for particular models of functional decomposition depends on the engineering values that are employed in choosing/evaluating them, and that these engineering values vary (and conflict) between modeling accounts. I conclude that the functional decomposition case exemplifies methodological incommensurability in the engineering domain.
Kuhn's analysis of values, in addition, led him to conclude that scientists' choice of (competing) theories can be considered rational. This conclusion has spawned extensive debate in philosophy of science. A key issue is whether in the absence of a commonly shared algorithm scientists' choice of theories can in fact be considered rational (Kuhn 1977) . Thus, authors that accept variation in values are pressed to show that theory choice by means of values ensures the rationality of scientists' choice of theories (Worrall 1988; Sankey 1995 Sankey , 2002 . I will address this issue in the functional decomposition case. I argue that the choice and usage of different models by different engineers is rational from a practical point of view. I construct this argument along the lines of a position developed by Sankey (2002) in which he combines variation of values with a means-end analysis of values. This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 I briefly present an overview of engineering notions of function and models of functional decomposition. Section 3 introduces the earlier analyses of co-existence. In section 4 I explain co-existence in terms of the thesis of methodological incommensurability. I argue for the rational grounds of co-existence in section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Engineering Notions of Function and Functional Decomposition
The concept of function has a flexible meaning in the engineering domain. An analysis of Vermaas (2009) established three archetypical ones: behavior functions that refer to the desired behaviors of a device, effect functions that refer to the desired effects of the behaviors of a device, and purpose functions that refer to the purposes for which a device is designed. And, in addition, I identified a fourth : action functions that refer to intentional behaviors carried out by an agent using a device.
Behavior function descriptions characterize conversions of matter and/or energy in which physical conservation laws are taken into account, thus referring to physical behaviors. An electric screwdriver's function of 'converting electricity into torque and heat' (Stone and Wood 2000: 364) , for instance, in which the energy of the electricity is supposed to equal the sum of the energies of heat and torque. Effect function descriptions also characterize (features of) behavior but do not take conservation laws into account, referring only to the desired effects of behavior. In case of a screwdriver's function, say, 'producing torque'. Purpose function descriptions refer to states of affairs intended by designers that are the final result(s) of behaviors. In the screwdriver case, say, 'having a rotational force down a shaft'. 3 Finally, action function descriptions are used to characterize user actions with a device; again in the screwdriver case, say, 'manually inserting a screw in a screw bit'.
These four notions of function are also described in engineering models of functional decomposition, i.e., graphical representations of organized sets of functions. Engineers put such models to a variety of uses. They use them, among others, in the conceptual phase of engineering designing to specify the desired functions of some artifact-to-be (Stone and Wood 2000; Chakrabarti and Bligh 2001) ; in the reverse engineering of existing artifacts to identify their functions (Otto and Wood 2001) ; and engineers use functional decomposition models to identify malfunctions of artifacts (Bell et al. 2007 ).
In this paper I consider three distinct engineering models of functional decomposition: a functional decomposition model of an organized set of behavior functions (behavior function fm D ), a functional decomposition model of an organized set of effect functions (effect function fm D ), and a functional decomposition model of an organized set of purpose functions (purpose function fm D ). 4 Examples of such models are given in Figures 1, 2 
Explaining Co-existence by Variation of Objectives or Design Knowledge Employment
Philosophical analyses of the usage, side-by-side, of different conceptualizations explicate this co-existence as having instrumental value to engineering (cf. Bucciarelli 1994 Bucciarelli , 2003 Vermaas 2009; Van Eck 2010a) . These analyses either relate specific conceptualizations (as suitable means) to specific objectives, or explicate the suitability of specific conceptualizations (as suitable means) to specific objectives in terms of design knowledge usage.
Object Worlds
Based on analyses of several cases of actual engineering design practice, Bucciarelli advances the argument that engineers practice their trades in different "object worlds" (Bucciareli 1994: 62; Bucciarelli 2003: 99) . The notion of an object world(s) conveys: "the idea that different participants in design see the object of design differently depending upon their competencies, responsibilities and their technical interests" (Bucciarelli 2003: 99) . Engineers from specific technical disciplines use conceptual frameworks in designing that are specific to their specialization; between technical disciplines there are differences in, amongst others, standards, regulations, mathematics, computer tools, and sketching and modeling tools (Bucciarelli 2003) . Exponents from different disciplines hence will conceptualize an object of design in different ways. And they may also interpret a concept or notion that is shared across object worlds in different ways. As Bucciarelli (2003) illustrates: "the same object, say a prismatic bar, to the structural engineer is a cantilever beam while to the person responsible for ensuring that the system does not overheat, it is a radiating appendage" (99). These different conceptualizations have value since engineers from different object worlds work on different features of the object of design for which the adopted conceptualizations are useful (Bucciarelli 2003: 9) . Phrased differently, these conceptualizations are useful for achieving specific objectives. For instance, the above conceptualization of a prismatic bar as a radiating appendage is useful when one's objective is preventing a system to overheat, whereas a cantilever beam-conceptualization serves other ends.
Although conceptualizations between object worlds may be at variance in a given case of designing, requiring negotiation to arrive at design decisions (Bucciarelli 2003: 101) , these co-existing conceptualizations thus can be validated in terms of their being useful means to achieve a variety of objectives.
Whereas the above work of Bucciarelli validates co-existing conceptualizations between distinct engineering disciplines, the analyses of Vermaas (2009) and myself (2010a) support such conceptual divergence within an engineering discipline, to wit: functional modeling in electromechanical engineering.
Simplifying Full Descriptions of Technical Artifacts
Vermaas (2009) argues that specific meanings of the concept of technical function are used in engineering to advance specific descriptions of technical artifacts. Since these descriptions are all useful to engineering, he thus explains why the concept of function is used with more than one meaning in the field. He develops his analysis in terms of the notions of a full and a simplified description of a technical artifact. Vermaas identifies five key concepts in full descriptions of technical artifacts: goals of agents that refer to states in the world that agents desire to realize by using artifacts; actions that refer to intentional behaviors that agents carry out when using artifacts; functions that refer to desired roles played by artifacts; behaviors that refer to physicochemical state changes of artifacts; and structures that refer to the physicochemical materials and fields of artifacts, their configurations, and their interactions. Vermaas (2009) argues that the flexible meaning of the concept of function affords different ways in which such full descriptions of technical artifacts can be simplified. Full descriptions in terms of the five key concepts are elaborate, and in particular engineering settings it makes sense to simplify them by "by-passing" one or more of the key concepts (Vermaas 2009: 2.119 ). Key to the analysis is that specific meanings of function are advantageous to specific by-passing simplifications. For instance, relative to the five key concepts, the concepts of action and behavior are by-passed in the account of Stone and Wood (2000) and the concept of function is used in its meaning of desired behavior (by specifying the role an artifact should play in terms of its behavior) to relate goals to structure. The concept of behavior is thus bypassed and the concept of function is instead used to refer to behavior(s). On the other hand, in the account of Lind (1994) the key concept of action is by-passed but not the concept of behavior. In this approach the concept of function is used in its meaning of desired effect of behavior (by specifying the role of the artifact in terms of the effects of the artifact's behavior) to relate goals to behavior. This analysis thus explains co-existing meanings of the concept of function (and the accounts in which these meanings are advanced) as useful for the advancement of different simplified descriptions of technical artifacts (objectives), all valuable to engineering.
fm D Choice and Knowledge Usage
In a similar vein, but focusing on the notion of design knowledge usage, I have argued that the choice for (constructing) particular fm D s (behavior function fm D s, effect function fm D s, and purpose function fm D s) is influenced by whether or not particular design knowledge is employed in their construction. And that depending on the particulars of such design knowledge employment, particular models are best suited for achieving particular design objectives (Van Eck 2010a). I thus explained and defended the keeping of different fm D s side-by-side (and the accounts in which they are advanced) in engineering design in terms of variation in design knowledge employment.
Among others, I considered fm D s that are used to support the objective of innovative design, characterized as the designing of new artifacts that have potentially novel (combinations of) function-structure connections (e.g. Pahl and Beitz 1988; Stone and Wood 2000) . Pahl and Beitz (1988) and Stone and Wood (2000) explicitly do not employ known function-structure connections (nor behavior-structure connections) in the construction of fm D s, but establish such function-structure mappings after the completion of fm D s. I argued that since known functionstructure connections are not taken into account in the construction phase, behavior function fm D s are best suited for the above objective since behavior function descriptions (which may include effects) are detailed enough to support the selection of (potentially novel) structures after the model is constructed. Purpose function fm D s and effect function fm D s, instead, are too coarsegrained to allow the selection of (potentially novel) structures in any precise way, when existing knowledge on function-structure connections is not considered in the construction phase of such models. The use of such models, skipping reference to behaviors and effects in purpose function fm D s and to behaviors in effect function fm D s, does not give (in a precise manner) those (potentially novel) structures that are suitable to achieve the functions of an artifact-to-be. For instance, a car's headlight effect-function "light on" may be suitable to select well-known structures such as an incandescent lamp or halogen one, but without a desired behavioral specification, the choice for, say, a more recent LED lamp (which differs in its behaviors by which the effect "light on" results) is less obvious.
On the other hand, I argued that other fm D s get favored when their construction is based on employing known (and required) behavior-structure relations of an existing artifact. For instance, for the objective of design analysis, characterized as verifying whether the functions of an artifact are achieved by the behaviors of the artifact in the intended manner, fm D s that are constructed based on known behavior-structure relations are used (e.g. Lind 1994; Bell et al. 2007 ). Given that both behavior and structure of an artifact are known, effect function fm D s are suited for verifying whether the behaviors exercised by structures achieve (in the intended fashion) the functions that are desired. Using a purpose function fm D , instead, skipping reference to effects, does not give the precision to ascertain whether or not the functions are indeed manifested in the intended way by the behaviors of the artifact. For instance, the purpose function "illumination in a room" may be sufficient for determining whether the behavior of the artifact implements this function. Yet, it is not suited to verify whether the behavior of the artifact implements this function in the intended way. In contrast, an effect function description, say, "switch on-light on", is suited for verifying whether the behavior of the artifact implements this function in the intended way: say, the switch might be "off" while the light is still on. Such a failure goes undetected with the purpose function description "illumination in a room" (more elaborate behavior function fm D s may also do the trick, but seem unnecessarily complex). Hence, given that behavior and structure of an artifact are known, effect function fm D s are best suited for verifying whether the functions of an artifact are achieved by the behaviors of the artifact in the intended manner.
My analysis, like the ones of Bucciarelli (1994) and Vermaas (2009) , shows the instrumental value of maintaining co-existence, in casu of different fm D s: depending on the specifics of the design knowledge employed, particular models are best suited for achieving particular objectives. 6 This explanation however holds (in informative fashion) for certain cases only. That is, insofar as the knowledge used in building models does not contain or refer to a specific notion of function or fm D , co-existence of models can be understood in terms of variation in knowledge usage. Yet, when the knowledge used does already refer to a specific notion of function or fm D , the choice for (the construction of) specific models is obvious, but explicating such choices in terms of knowledge employment would become circular. For instance, in the case of the objective of routine designing (characterized as the designing of new artifacts by using knowledge of function-structure connections of existing types of the to-be-designed artifact) puts forward purpose function fm D s that are build using known connections between purpose functions and structures as means toward this objective. Since these connections are known and employed, purpose function fm D s are obviously opted for. However, explicating the choice for these fm D s in terms of the usage of known purpose function-structure connections would introduce circularity in the explanation. Moreover, as I will argue in the next section, effect function fm D s and behavior function fm D s that are also built using connections between these notions of function and structure, respectively, are advanced as well as means toward this objective of routine designing. Hence, different explanatory constructs than variety in objectives and variation in knowledge usage are needed to explain cases such as these. These constructs do not provide the requisite explanatory leverage when one wants to explain why different fm D s are used side-by-side as means for achievement of the same objective, and the knowledge used to build them already refers to specific notions of function or fm D . In such cases, other explanatory constructs are needed. The work of Kuhn and others on methodological incommensurability and the dynamics of theory choice provide concepts suited to explicate such cases, as I will argue in the next section. Kuhn (1970: 148-150) initially used the term incommensurability in a holistic fashion to capture methodological, observational, and conceptual incompatibilities between successive scientific paradigms. In later work (e.g. Kuhn 1991) he narrowed down and specified his notion of incommensurability further in terms of differences in the taxonomic structure of successive scientific theories. On this "semantic" reading of incommensurability, translation failure occurs between kind terms of competing theories due to the unmatchable classificatory schemes/taxonomic structures underlying these theories (Kuhn 1991) . In such cases, theories classify the same objects into different kinds, the members of which are (taken to be) governed by different natural laws. Translation of kind terms between theories then will fail since the nomic expectations attached to these terms are incompatible between theories. For instance, Ptolemy's theory classifies the sun as a planet, where planets orbit around the earth, whereas Copernicus' theory classifies the sun as a star, where planets orbit stars. A Copernican claim such as planets orbiting the sun is incompatible with Ptolemy's framework, hence translation of the kind term 'sun' between these theories will fail (Kuhn 1991: 94) . As Kuhn's later treatment of incommensurability focused mainly on semantic aspects, some commentators began to distinguish two different notions of incommensurability: on the one hand the above-mentioned semantic incommensurability and on the other "methodological" incommensurability, which involves epistemic standards that are used to evaluate competing theories (Kuhn 1970 (Kuhn , 1977 cf. Sankey 1999; Carrier 2008; Soler 2008; Oberheim and Hoyningen-Huene 2009 ).
Methodological Incommensurability in Engineering

Methodological Incommensurability
The development of the thesis of methodological incommensurability is traced back to Kuhn's (as well as Feyerabend's) rejection of the view held by both the Logical Positivist movement and Popper that a distinguishing feature of science is the use of a uniform scientific method that remains fixed throughout scientific development, and on the basis of which theory choice can be determined unambiguously (Oberheim and Hoyningen-Huene 2009; cf. Kuhn 1970: 94, 103 ). 7 Kuhn challenged the view of an invariant scientific method that is capable of governing theory choice in such unambiguous fashion. He argued, instead, that standards or criteria of theory appraisal, such as accuracy, consistency, fruitfulness, scope, and simplicity (1977: 322) depend on and vary between paradigms. Kuhn pressed the point that such standards do not function as algorithmic rules that are able to determine theory choice but rather as values that only guide it (1977: 331) . Epistemic values refer to characteristics or properties of scientific theories that are considered desirable by scientists relative to their objectives. The history of science shows that disputes between advocates of rival theoretical frameworks are not solved by recourse to a neutral algorithm that is capable of dictating theory choice, since there is no commonly shared set of criteria or standards available on the basis of which such a choice can be forged (Kuhn 1970 (Kuhn , 1977 . 8 Based on this construal of theory choice in terms of values and the observation that scientists (can) differ in the values they employ, Kuhn (1977) concluded that scientists may rationally disagree in theory choice. This disagreement may have different sources. First, advocates of rival scientific frameworks may differ in the values they employ in theory choice and appraisal. Second, values may conflict when applied to concrete cases of theory choice. For instance, scope may favor one theory, yet simplicity another. Theory choice then entails assigning weight/relevance to such values, which advocates of rival frameworks may do so in different fashion. Third, advocates of rival scientific frameworks may also interpret the content of values differently. What is, for instance, precisely meant when one speaks about accuracy? Based on these considerations, Kuhn (1970 Kuhn ( , 1977 concluded that there is no commonly shared algorithm available for theory choice.
Summing up, key elements of this position are the closely related notions of "non-algorithmic theory choice" and "methodological variation" (Sankey 1995 (Sankey , 2002 , that is, variation in how and/or which (set of) values are employed in theory choice. Furthermore, the theories in question are advanced to meet what we may call a 'common objective': they purport to explain the same (or substantially overlapping) range of phenomena (e.g. Soler: 2008) . I use (and expand on) the notion of variation in values in section 4.2 to explain co-existence of different engineering fm D s that are advanced as means to achieve a common objective. 9 My earlier explanation of co-existence in terms of variation in knowledge usage (section 3.3) also hinges upon (though not phrased as such), in an engineering-modeling rather than a scientifictheoretical context, the idea of variation in values: knowledge usage specifics, such as employing known function-structure connections or behavior-structure relations during the construction of fm D s correspond to values engineers have that influence their choices for particular models. These values are not ones that are operative in a scientific-theoretical context (epistemic values) but they do function similarly, in an engineering-modeling context, as factors that influence engineers their choices for particular fm D s. Let us capture this similarity by calling such factors engineeringvalues, or "e-values" for short. I define an engineering value as a characteristic or property of a functional decomposition model or a functional decomposition strategy that is considered desirable by an engineer relative to an objective. 10, 11 However, as indicated in section 3.3, evalues relating to knowledge usage do not provide the requisite explanatory leverage in the case of routine designing. I consider other e-values to explicate this case.
Incommensurability in Engineering: the Case of Functional Decomposition and Routine Designing
In the engineering literature, in the electro-mechanical domain, different fm D s are advanced as means for achieving the (common) objective of "routine design": behavior function fm D s (Chakrabarti and Bligh 2001) , effect function fm D s (Kitamura and Mizoguchi 2003) , as well as purpose function fm D s (Deng et al. 2000a (Deng et al. , 2000b ) are put forward as means for achieving this objective. 12 In the above accounts in which these particular models are advanced this objective is characterized as the designing of new artifacts by using knowledge of functionstructure connections of existing types of the to-be-designed artifact (references see above).
Variation of e-Values
Analysis of these accounts shows that their developers advance different e-values that their proposed fm D s are to satisfy. These e-values are given in Table 1 .
Structural compatibility
The spatial organization that an fm D provides must be such that all functions of the structures contained in the spatial organization are achieved Function-behavior independency Descriptions of functions in an fm D should be such that they do not describe their underlying behavior and are organized in sets in terms of knowledge of their underlying behavior Function-to-function independency
The functions in an fm D must be independent from one another in the sense that realization of a given function by a structure is (considered to be) independent from realization of other function(s), and vice versa In the Chakrabarti-Bligh (CB) account fm D s must satisfy the e-value of what we may call 'structural compatibility'. The (input-output) organization of functions in an fm D also provides a spatial organization of the structures that achieve them. 13 And the spatial organization that a model provides must be such that any negative interactions between structures (as a result of which structures would fail to achieve their functions) do not occur, so that all the functions of the structures contained in the spatial organization are achieved (Chakrabarti and Bligh 2001) . In other words, structures contained in the spatial organization provided by an fm D must be compatible with one another. 14 In the Functional Concept Ontology (FCO) account (Kitamura and Mizoguchi 2003; Kitamura et al. 2005/6; Kitamura et al. 2007 ) another e-value, which we may call 'function-behavior independency' is emphasized. This e-value prescribes that descriptions of functions in fm D s should be such that they do not describe their underlying behavior and are organized in sets in terms of knowledge of their underlying behavior (descriptions that do refer to underlying behavior are coined "quasi-functions"). These authors distinguish the concept of function from the concept of behavior. And in fm D s those functions that make up another function are grouped together (organized) in sets based on knowledge of their underlying behavior and structure, thus distinguishing functional from behavioral descriptions.
Yet another e-value is emphasized in the Dual Stage (DS) account (Deng et al. 2000a (Deng et al. , 2000b ), which we may call 'function-to-function independency'. This e-value prescribes that the functions in an fm D must be independent from one another in the sense that realization of a given function by a structure does not depend on the (prior) realization of another function by another structure . For instance, a washing machine's function of 'washing laundry' can be independent (for its realization) from its function of 'drying laundry' . (In this account, the behaviors underlying the functions in an fm D are not considered to be independent, but causally related).
As can be seen, different e-values for fm D s hold in these accounts. This variation in e-values provides means to explain the choice for/construction of different fm D s in these accounts, as I will argue below.
Explaining fm D Choice by e-values
Given the emphasis in the CB account on the e-value of structural compatibility, one can understand why behavior functions fm D s are (chosen to be) developed. When the spatial organization that an fm D provides must be such that any negative interactions between structures (as a result of which structures would fail to realize their functions) do not occur, behavior function fm D s are best equipped to provide such a spatial organization. Such fm D s contain the details needed for assessing whether the output characteristics of one structure's function match/are compatible with the input characteristics of another structure's function. Say, the heat generated when energy is converted into torque by an electric screwdriver's motor may negatively interact with the electrical wiring connected to the motor, possibly leading to failure of their 'transmitting electricity' function (and hence the motor's function as well). Purpose and effect function fm D s seem too course-grained to satisfy this e-value of structural compatibility. For instance, the effect function 'produce torque' of a screwdriver's motor does not contain the information required to assess its compatibility with the electrical wiring
In the FCO account, on the other hand, structural compatibility is already assumed to be in place. In these fm D s, those functions that make up another function are grouped together (organized) in sets based on knowledge of their underlying behavior and structure (Kitamura et al. 2005/6) . One needs to assume that the structures (and behaviors) underlying the functions in fm D s are compatible for otherwise sets of functions making up/achieving other functions would fail to do so (these authors make this assumption: fm D s are models of existing and working artifacts).
In the DS account, structural compatibility is not something that fm D s should satisfy. Rather, in this account, both the assembly of structures and the verification of whether assembled structures meet the design requirements take place in later design phases after fm D s are constructed . 15 Next to the structural compatibility assumption, fm D s in the FCO account must satisfy the e-value of function-behavior independency. Given this e-value one can understand why effect function fm D s are developed. When descriptions of functions in fm D s must be such that they do not describe their underlying behavior and are organized in terms of their underlying behavior (and structure), behavior function fm D s will (obviously) not be opted for since the functions in such models describe behaviors. And since functions in fm D s are grouped together based on knowledge of their underlying behavior and structure one can also understand why purpose function fm D s are not chosen. By using purpose function fm D s, in which functions refer to states of affairs that are the final result(s) of behavior, one skips reference to the more immediate effects of behaviors and structures. Compared with effect function fm D s, the grouping of functions in sets based on their underlying behavior and structure is less straightforwardly established with such purpose function fm D s.
In the latter case, the connection between function-behavior-structure is less straightforward. For instance, the purpose function "to tell time" can be achieved by a wide variety of behaviors and structures. The effect function description "rotate arms in clockwise direction" on the other hand is more easily connectable to specific behaviors and structures (and sets of such functions thus more straightforwardly organized in terms of behavioral and structural knowledge).
In the CB account, this function-behavior independency is not an e-value that fm D s must satisfy. On the contrary, as we saw, in these fm D s functions refer to behaviors. Neither do fm D s satisfy this e-value in the DS account. Functions in purpose function fm D s are not organized in terms of knowledge of their underlying behavior (what they do have in common with fm D s in the FCO account is that functions in DS fm D s do not describe their underlying behavior since they characterize states of affairs that are the final results of behaviors).
Given the third e-value of function-to-function independency that fm D s in the DS account must satisfy, one can understand why purpose function fm D s are developed. When functions in an fm D are required to be independent from one another in the sense that realization of a given function is independent from the realization of other function(s), and vice versa, purpose function fm D s seem most suited. Such models allow one to conceive most clearly of the realization of functions as being independent from the realization of other functions. For instance, realization of the behavior function 'transmitting torque' of an electric screwdriver requires, say, prior realization of the behavior function 'converting electricity into torque'. Similarly, realization of the electric screwdriver's effect function 'produce torque' requires, say, prior realization of the effect function 'generate electricity'. In contrast, realization of the purpose function of, say, 'having a rotational force' is more easily conceived as independent from the realization of other functions. Hence, models of purpose functions satisfy this e-value best.
In contrast, function-to-function independency is not an e-value in the FCO account since functions in fm D s that jointly achieve another function are grouped in sets (based on knowledge of their underlying behavior and structure) and hence not (considered to be) independently realized. Fm D s in the CB account also do not satisfy this e-value. Functions in fm D s are organized in terms of their input-output characterizations and thus for their realization dependent on one another (and on the structural compatibility of their underlying structures). This analysis is summarized graphically in Table 2 In a similar vein as Kuhn (1970 Kuhn ( , 1977 Kuhn ( , 1983 ) explained scientists' choices for different theories in terms of differences in epistemic values, I thus offer an explanation why different fm D s are used side-by-side in engineering in terms of variation in e-values. Kuhn's analysis of values, in addition, led him to conclude that scientists' choice of (competing) theories can be considered rational. This conclusion has spawned extensive debate in philosophy of science (Kuhn 1977; McMullin 1983; Laudan 1987; Worrall 1988 : Sankey 1995 . Initially, a key issue was whether in the absence of a commonly shared algorithm scientists' choice of theories can in fact be considered rational. More recently, this debate has shifted in orientation: both advocates of a single method for theory choice and authors that accept variation in values are pressed to show that their preferred single method or spectrum of values ensure the rationality of scientists' choice of theories (Worrall 1988; Sankey 1995 Sankey , 2002 ).
I will address this issue in the engineering functional decomposition case: can engineers' choices for different fm D s be considered rational from an instrumental point of view? I will argue that variation in e-values ensures that the choice and usage of different fm D s by different engineers is rational from a practical point of view. Kuhn (1983) took the position that the rationality of scientists' choice of theories is ensured by the concept of science itself (see also Sankey 1999 ). Kuhn's position has however been criticized on the grounds that he never satisfactorily addressed the challenge to explicate how variation in epistemic values ensures rational theory choice (Hempel 1983; Sankey 1999 ). In the case of values, the challenge is to show that the values one considers are appropriate ones for the evaluation and choice of scientific theories. A value is considered appropriate for theory choice if a theory that satisfies a particular value contributes to the attainment of a scientific objective (that one aims to achieve with the theory) precisely because the theory satisfies that value (Hempel 1983; McMullin 1983; Sankey 2002) . Stated differently, that the (desired) characteristics or properties of the chosen theory indeed are the features by means of which the theory contributes to attainment of an objective that one aims to achieve with the theory. Insofar as values are appropriate, maintaining variation of these values in theory choice is considered rational. Advocates of value variation consider such means-end interpretations of values an asset (Laudan 1987; Teller 2008) . It allows for the possibility to rationally compare the merits of competing theories (or scientific models): this theory/model is better with respect to this value, that theory/model is better with respect to that value.
Rationality in Engineering
Values and Theoretical Rationality
Several interpretations of such means-end relationships between epistemic values and scientific objectives are given in philosophy of science. Some assert that appropriate values contribute to the attainment of a main or ultimate objective of science, such as empirical adequacy or truth (McMullin 1983) . Others do not invoke the notion of an ultimate objective and argue that specific values contribute to more specific objectives (Laudan 1987; Teller 2008 Returning to the first e-value of structural compatibility that is satisfied by fm D s in the CB account, we can explicate these fm D s as contributing to a sub objective of what we may call "accuracy", to wit: that all the functions in an fm D are realized. In order for this sub objective to be achieved an fm D must satisfy structural compatibility: the spatial organization that an fm D provides must be such that any negative interactions between structures do not occur, so that all the functions of the structures contained in the spatial organization are realized. 18 Since this evalue is already assumed to be satisfied in the FCO account, so is its related sub objective. In the DS account, this e-value and sub objective are addressed in later design stages after fm D s are constructed.
In similar fashion we can interpret fm D s satisfying the e-value of function-behavior independency, as endorsed in the FCO account, as contributing to a sub objective of what we may call "knowledge management of design rationale". This account aims to capture (rather ambitiously) the rationale of engineers that lies behind their construction of particular functional descriptions and fm D s (for archival and cross-communication purposes in design) (Sasajima et al. 1996; Kitamura et al. 2007 ). Capturing such "design rationale" is according to these authors in engineering done in an idiosyncratic fashion in the sense that its analysis depends on the considerations of the model builder. They aim to overcome this idiosyncrasy by developing systematic guidelines for the capturing of design rationale behind fm D s in more explicit and reusable fashion. Key assumption in the development of these guidelines is that of all the possible input-output relations of technical behaviors only some input, output, or input-output relations are intended in a given context and hence will be used for developing functional descriptions and fm D s. They also define primitives to isolate those input, output, or input-output relations that are used to develop descriptions of functions and fm D s in particular contexts (Sasajima et al. 1996) . Given this aim to capture design intent systematically, that is, the sub objective of "knowledge management of design rationale", and this key assumption underlying it, we can interpret fm D s satisfying the e-value of function-behavior independency as contributing to this sub objective. Given this underlying assumption, fm D s satisfying the e-value of distinguishing function from its underlying behavior contribute to capturing design intent in systematic fashion. This e-value and sub objective are not emphasized in the CB and DS accounts.
Fm D s satisfying the e-value of function-to-function independency, as endorsed in the DS account, can be analyzed as contributing to a sub objective that we may call "broad scope in functionstructure mapping". If functions-structure connections can be considered independent from other function-structure connections, one can search the available spectrum of design solutions to a given function. If the realization of a function by a structure would depend on the (prior) realization of another function by another structure, the range of structure-function connections would decrease. A selection of a particular design solution to a function would then constrain the possible design solutions one can choose for functions that must be realized prior to this function. By considering function-structure connections as independent, this constraint does not apply. Hence, a broad range of functions-structure connections can be considered Achievement of each of these sub objectives, in turn, all contributes to the main (and common) objective of routine designing. The sub objective of accuracy that all the functions in an fm D are realized is crucial to the design of any artifact, irrespective of whether it is arrived at in routine or innovative fashion. Achievement of the sub objective of establishing knowledge management of design rationale -facilitating the consistent archival and cross-communication of design knowledge -is clearly instrumental toward the designing of artifacts in collaborative settings. And achievement of the sub objective of having broad scope in function-structure mapping, i.e., keeping the range of potential structures for functions as broad as possible, may support 'innovative/creative' combinations of structures of an artifact-to-be.
We thus reach the conclusion that the e-values that I considered are appropriate ones for the evaluation and choice of fm D s: particular fm D s are suited to achieve particular sub and main objectives because these fm D s satisfy particular e-values. This analysis in terms of e-values shows that specific models have specific advantages: depending on the e-values (and sub objectives) that engineers deem important, specific fm D s are better than others. For instance, if one values compatibility of structures, then one better opts for a behavior function fm D ; if one values independence of function-structure connections, one better picks a purpose function fm D . There is not one fm D that satisfies all such engineering values best. Hence, I submit that the usage of different fm D s by different engineers is rational from a practical point of view.
A qualification is in order. From the analyzed case it does not automatically follow that functional modeling research will not eventually converge toward a single fm D . What the analysis does show is that modeling researchers have valid reasons not to do so, and my bet is that they will not. Another issue is whether the modeling field will eventually settle on a best behavior function fm D , effect function fm D , and purpose function fm D , respectively. Given the current plethora of functional modeling accounts, it may turn out at some point in the future that the current situation is then interpreted as, say, "pre-paradigmatic", and accounts will have converged toward, say, three best accounts for the modeling of behavior function fm D s, effect function fm D s, and purpose function fm D s, respectively. My bet is that this scenario is unlikely as well: closer scrutiny will probably reveal other e-values and sub objectives that are served especially well with particular variants of the three considered fm D s. For instance, effect function fm D s in which the functions are represented by triggers and effects (see the "switch on-light on" example in section 3.3) seem better suited for failure analysis than effect function fm D s in which functions are represented in term of desired output only (e.g. "light on").
Conclusion
In this paper I have explained the co-existence of different models of functional decomposition in terms of the thesis of methodological incommensurability. I advanced this analysis in terms of the thesis' construal of (non-algorithmic) theory choice in terms of values, expanding this notion to the engineering domain. I further argued that co-existence of different models of functional decomposition is rational from an instrumental point of view.
